In the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, new and challenger parties have enjoyed electoral gains in some European countries. Political and economic disaffection have been pointed out as the main drivers of their electoral support. This article proposes voter's stealth democracy attitudes, as defined by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), as an additional driving force to account for this electoral change. We examine the case of Spain with a survey conducted after the far-reaching transformation of the party system, which has led to the emergence of two new parties: Ciudadanos (on the center-right) and Podemos (on the radical left). We find that stealth democracy attitudes are positively related to the support for the former and negatively related to the support for the latter. Additionally, we provide evidence of this relationship being conditional on voters' ideology. The study illustrates how an unexplored attitudinal dimension contributes to party system change, and how the relevance of these attitudes might go beyond the temporary political discontent caused by the economic crisis.
Introduction
Political support for non-mainstream parties has risen against the backdrop of the 2008 Great Recession. In the wake of the economic crisis, recent elections in some European countries have often resulted in important gains for new and challenger parties (Hino, 2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016) . Following an economic voting logic, dissatisfied voters initially punished incumbents for their failing economic performance, voting for the mainstream opposition (Bartels, 2014; Kriesi, 2014; Magalhães, 2014) ; yet, the continuity of the crisis and the implementation of austerity policies by all of the mainstream parties have finally driven many discontented voters to support new and challenger parties (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016) .
Besides voters' political and economic disaffection, this article proposes an additional mechanism to account for the rise of new parties, namely voters' attitudes towards democratic decision-making processes. New and challenger parties stand not only as fierce critics of the incumbents' economic management, but also as political reformers of democratic procedures. In doing so, they might have matched the supposedly growing demand for changes in political decision-making among Western publics.
However, little is known about the effect of the public's attitudes towards different procedures of decision-making on voting behavior. This article fills this gap by analyzing, for the first time, how stealth democracy attitudes, as defined by the seminal study of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) , affect individuals' support for some new and challenger parties that have risen in the context of the 2008 Great Recession.
Stealth democracy attitudes gather together preferences on democratic political decisionmaking procedures, leaning not towards individuals' increase in political engagement, but in favor of delegation, efficiency, and experts' involvement in political decision-making.
Stealth democracy attitudes also are reactions against 'politics as usual', and following the 2008 Great Recession they have increasingly captured scholars' attention (Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009; Font et al., 2012 and Webb, 2013; Coffé and Michels, 2014) , but an analysis of their potential electoral consequences is still lacking. 59) call the 'process space' of competition, presenting different party views on the democratic decision-making processes and putting them high on the agenda. In this way, voters dissatisfied with the political process have an alternative to mainstream parties and, following Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) , stealth democracy attitudes should influence party choice in such a context. Consequently, the Spanish setting is an optimum circumstance to test the effect of stealth democracy attitudes on party support.
Our findings show that the stealth democracy index (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002) helps to predict the intention to vote for new and challenger parties: negatively for the radical-left Podemos, and positively for the center-right Ciudadanos. These findings support Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's (2002) insights because Podemos is a populist and proparticipatory democracy party, while Ciudadanos aims to reform democratic procedures without calling for high-intensity citizen participation. We show that the electoral impact of these attitudes is independent from structural factors as well as the influence of other short-term orientations. Additionally, we find evidence of this relationship being conditional on voters' ideology. Stealth democracy attitudes increase the probability of voting for the new center-right Ciudadanos when voters are ideologically moderate. Therefore, stealth democracy attitudes are not only important because they are widely spread, but also because they play a relevant role in explaining voters' preferences for a new type of right-to-the-center party.
This study makes a series of valuable contributions. First, it updates the information about stealth democracy orientations with data from a period in which the consequences of the public's discontent after the 2008 Great Recession in Western Europe are fully apparent in the attitudes towards decision-making processes. It replicates Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's model for Spain confirming that stealth democracy orientations are widely spread and that the numbers of those in favor of experts' involvement in policymaking have increased.
Second, this article extends the field of study of stealth democracy attitudes. Although previous studies have investigated the determinants of these attitudes, they have left the electoral consequences of stealth democracy unexplored. This article explores the effects of these attitudes on party choice. In doing so, it increases our knowledge on the attitudinal determinants of the rising support for new and challenger parties.
Third, our results also inform the debate about the ongoing party systems change in Western European countries. While much information is already available on the determinants of the radical-right populist vote, our analyses demonstrate how, in the present context of political disaffection, stealth democracy attitudes foster the support for right-to-the-center parties that, although critical of 'politics as usual', cannot be considered radical populists. Therefore, we illustrate how an unexplored attitudinal dimension contributes to party system change in the context of economic and political discontent.
Finally, this article contributes to the methodological discussion about the suitability of the stealth democracy index (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002 ) examining the effect of its different components separately. With this exploratory exercise, the study provides a more nuanced image of the relationship between stealth democracy and voting: we find that support for experts' involvement in decision-making is critical when explaining the vote for the new center-right party Ciudadanos.
The article proceeds as follows: the next two sections summarize previous findings in this field and present the hypotheses that guide our research, then we briefly introduce the Spanish context. After succinctly describing the data, the variables and the methods used in the analyses, we explain our main findings presenting an analysis of how stealth democracy attitudes affect the support for different parties, with a particular focus on the conditional role played by ideology. We end the article with a review of the limits of the stealth democracy index and an analysis that breaks down this conventional measure, and finally the conclusions and implications for further research.
Attitudes towards democratic decision-making processes and stealth democracy orientations
Political dissatisfaction and distrust for fundamental actors of representative democracies -such as parties and politicians -are widely spread in advanced democracies (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004; Allen and Birch, 2014) . Demands for more participatory and direct decision-making processes have increased and have already been documented in some studies (Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan and Karp, 2006; Bowler et al., 2007; Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009; Anderson and Goodyear-Grant, 2010; Neblo et al., 2010) . However, the literature has also shown some limits in the support for increased participation (Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan and Karp, 2006; Font et al., 2012) , has demonstrated that these demands do not translate into actual participation (Webb 2013) , and has cast doubt on the nature of the support for more direct procedures (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984) .
The influential studies of Theiss-Morse (2001, 2002) probably portray the most skeptical views of both the advantages of participatory democracy and of the commitment to this form of democratic participation in the US. They argue that Americans prefer a stealth version of democracy, one in which the usual representative democracy institutions and procedures are in place and work better, and which does not require much involvement from and monitoring of the citizens. Stealth democrats would not be very interested in the high-intensity commitment implied by participatory or deliberative political processes, favoring instead delegation, efficiency and expert input in the decision-making processes. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 143) say, stealth democrats' preference is 'for decisions to be made efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagreement'. Stealth democrats prefer the involvement of experts and independent bodies in government decisions, and less partisanship, discussion and individuals' active political engagement. Thus, stealth democracy, with its negative view of debate and compromise, and its willingness to hand over decision-making to unaccountable but efficient actors, would be opposed to the deliberative or participatory versions of democracy and would entail even less citizen involvement than the standard representative democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 2, 10, 161 and 239) . Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) and other studies that have followed their thread have analyzed the political correlates of stealth democracy attitudes. Font et al. (2012) found for the Spanish case that right-wing ideology is associated with stealth democracy attitudes. Webb (2013) analyzed the political attitudes associated with stealth democracy orientations for the British case confirming that stealth democrats tend then to avoid increased political commitment. Additionally, Webb (2013) found that they express distinguishing views regarding decision-making processes and political participation, being less eager to be involved in conventional (party and non-party arenas) and deliberative types of participation than in the referendum democracy type of 
Stealth democracy and party politics
Those circumstances in which attitudes towards decision-making processes, such as the stealth democracy orientations, may affect party preference are prominent in Western Europe. Parties have reacted to this challenging environment, which, outstandingly, includes a rise in citizens' mistrust for conventional political actors (Dennis and Owen 2001; Mair 2013) . There has been a growth in the use of referenda, deliberative 2 Among the studies analyzing socio-demographic correlates, the one by Coffé and Michels (2014) focusing on the role of education for the Dutch case is particularly insightful. mechanisms and other participatory devices across advanced democracies (Smith 2009; Michels 2011) . Moreover, in organizational terms, numerous parties have adopted more inclusive internal procedures (Cain et al., 2004) . However, despite these efforts, new, challenger, and populist parties make strategic use of citizens' discontent towards their mainstream competitors (Bergh, 2004; Pauwels, 2014; Passarelli, and Tuorto, 2016) .
Many of these parties present themselves to the public as anti-political establishment parties, criticizing the privileges of mainstream parties and 'politics as usual'. In different ways, these parties propose weakening the political-establishment grip on decisionmaking; some propose reducing the role of parties in decision-making processes, favoring anti-majoritarian institutions or non-party political procedures; others propose the use of participatory and direct democracy decision-making processes to strengthen common citizens' political influence (see, for example, Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013 , 2014) . Amidst an intense dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation, the evaluation of the political situation has reached very negative levels, and parties and politicians are considered among the major problems of the country (Torcal, 2014a) 4 .
Additionally, polls and elections results during the crisis signaled a situation of partisan dealignment, with the two largest mainstream parties, the center-left PSOE and the conservative PP, losing support since the worsening of the economic indicators (Torcal, 2014b; Cordero and Montero, 2015) . Spanish public opinion has rejected both the 4 According to the polls of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (the governmental opinion poll institute), before the crisis, "political parties, politicians and politics" were barely an issue for Spanish society. While almost all interviewees pointed to "unemployment" or "ETA terrorism" as the most important problem in Spain, between 1993 and 2008 only 8% of the public exhibited signals of political discontent. In contrast, since January 2008 polls have registered a sudden increase in the number of citizens claiming that "political parties, politicians and politics" are the major problem of the country. Ciudadanos is a new center-right or liberal party that has very often stressed its nature of political reform, proposing a catalogue of policies aiming to revitalize Spanish democracy (Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio, 2015) . They defend a reduction of party influence on the judiciary and public prosecution systems, and of MPs and politicians privileges, leaner public administration, a strengthening of the control functions of parliament, and an increase in transparency and access to government information (Ciudadanos, 2015) .
However, in its 2015 manifesto, policies aiming to enhance citizens' participation were circumscribed to the local government level and to the simplification of the popular legislative initiatives procedures.
Podemos is a new radical-left party that uses populist discourse (Ramiro and Gómez, 2016; Llamazares and Gómez-Reino, 2015) . Having been formed by a group of left-wing activists, Podemos' platform includes both anti-political establishment claims and participatory demands. The populist leaning of the party is reflected in its use of the people vs. elite dichotomy. Consequently, Podemos has targeted in its attacks the politicalestablishment and mainstream parties, identified as 'caste' parties. While in some political reform policies Podemos does not differ from Ciudadanos, the former is much more ambitious and radical in its participatory plans. Podemos defends deliberative democracy, recall referenda, mandatory primaries and citizens' involvement in policy evaluation (Podemos, 2015) .
In sum, Spain displays high levels of dissatisfaction with key representative democracy actors such as parties, while new parties (Ciudadanos and Podemos) offer alternative policies aiming to reform the political process. Stealth democracy orientations should foster the support for these parties as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) suggested. However, they differ in their manifestoes' content regarding the desired level of citizens' involvement in political decision-making. It is these differences regarding decision-making processes that divert our expectations of the effect of stealth democracy attitudes on party choice (hypotheses 1 and 2 above).
Data and methods
Questions on preferences about political decision-making processes are rarely asked in regular surveys. To test our hypotheses and overcome the lack of suitable data we Almost all respondents (95%) agree with the 'less talk and more action' statement, while the number halves when it comes to whether or not compromising should be taken as abandoning principles. Only 1 out of 3 sympathizes with the idea that leaving decisions to successful business people would make politics work well, and 3 out of 4 support leaving decisions up to experts instead of politicians or citizens. After computing the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse stealth democracy index we learn that 52% of the respondents score 3 points (the maximum), while 35% score 2 points, 11% only 1 point and a very marginal fraction of the sample none. Therefore, there is extensive support for stealth attitudes among Spaniards.
( Table 1 about In order to obtain an unbiased coefficient for stealth democracy, we run the models also Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in the appendix. We do logistic regression analyses since our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coding individuals' intention to vote for a party, although results are robust to OLS estimations.
Stealth democracy orientations and their effect on party support
The analysis of the influence of stealth democracy orientation on party choice using the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse index confirms two of our hypotheses (Table 2) 11
. A marginal increase in the stealth democracy index boosts the likelihood of voting for the new center-right political-reform party Ciudadanos (Hypothesis 1), while it decreases the likelihood of supporting the radical-left populist Podemos (Hypothesis 2). However, the latter association is not as statistically strong as the former. In contrast, the stealth democracy index is not a significant predictor of the support for mainstream parties and Hypothesis 3 should not be accepted.
As we expected, the findings shown in the last three columns of Table 2 -Morse, 2002; Bengtson and Mattila, 2009; Font et al., 2012; Webb, 2013; Coffé and Michels, 2014) . For the purpose of our analysis it is remarkable how these orientations are related to right-wing ideology and negatively associated with political interest and efficacy.
(Analyses are not shown in the article, but they are available upon request).
towards individual high-intensity involvement. This finding holds after controlling for conventional factors in voting models (Model 1), attitudinal variables such as dissatisfaction with democracy and preferences for political decision-making processes (Model 2), or evaluation of the current state of the economy (Model 3). Moreover, this result is robust to additional checks regarding the way we estimate our coefficients, the specification of the model or the operationalization of the dependent variable 12 .
( Table 2 about Podemos is compared with the probability of voting for Ciudadanos (see O.A.6). In other words, we can take stealth democracy attitudes as a trustworthy (negative) predictor of voting if we focus on the competition between the new parties. 12 We provide a set of robustness checks in an Online Appendix (O.A.) hosted on the website of the journal. Table O .A.4 we present three different specifications of the model. In the first one, we control for age squared given the positive and significant association found between stealth attitudes and age. The second accounts for evaluation of the current political situation instead of current evaluations of the economy. In the third alternative specification we control for interviewees' votes in the previous General Election (2011). However, the stealth democracy index does not appear as a significant predictor in any of the models for mainstream party support (PP and PSOE). Ideology is, in any case, a relevant variable to explain the electoral support for all political parties across the board and it has been shown in previous studies that stealth democrats have right wing leanings. However, these two variables are not so highly correlated to make us think of a spurious relationship between stealth attitudes and party choices (correlation coefficient of about 0.12). We have assessed how ideological orientations condition the way stealth democracy attitudes affect party choice, thus deepening our understanding of how voters' attitudes translate into voting preferences for some new parties. Table A On the one hand, the interaction between stealth democracy and ideology is negative and statistically different from zero in the analysis for Podemos. As expected, the range where the ideology moderates the relationship is in the left, namely between 0 and 3 (see the upper-left graph in Figure 3 ). As the ideological position of the interviewees moves to the right the marginal impact of stealth democracy on the probability of voting for Podemos decreases. Contrary to the unconditional analysis, this result gives support for 14 We differentiate from the standard practice by exploring non-linear associations between stealth democracy and ideology since we do not find compelling reasons to expect a linear relationship between these two variables. Indeed, extreme ideological positions (either leftist or rightist) might be at odds with stealth democracy attitudes. Individuals with such intense political orientations might be more willing to advocate more intense political involvement, so we could expect an inverted U-shape relationship between these two variables.
Hypothesis 2: stealth democracy orientations are negatively associated with electoral support for the new radical-left populist party Podemos despite being anti-mainstream.
On the other hand, the linear interaction between ideology and the index of stealth democracy does not provide clear results on the probability of voting for Ciudadanos (upper-right graph in Figure 3 ). Yet, the nonlinear interaction does (see bottom-right graph). Thus, stealth democracy attitudes especially contribute to the explanation of the votes for new right-to-the-center parties if voters are not ideological extremists 15 .
Among the control variables, some results merit some additional comments. For instance, we find that the parameter for level of disaffection with the democratic system is negatively associated with the support for traditional parties. The probability of voting for PP or PSOE decreases as the level of dissatisfaction with democracy increases, which is consistent with the motivation of this study, i.e. political discontent against the backdrop of the Great Recession. However, disaffection with democracy is not associated with support for the new and challenger parties. Neither voting for Podemos nor for Ciudadanos shows a significant relationship with discontent. These results suggest that some level of alienation from the democratic system could be a necessary but not sufficient condition for new parties to gain electoral support. This is something that indeed underlines the statistically significant findings found for the role of stealth democracy attitudes. 15 Beside the conditional role of ideology in the relationship between stealth democracy attitudes and vote choice, we assessed the potential role of less structural factors such as interviewees' perception of the economic situation, since the economic crisis could determine how stealth orientations shape the vote choice. 
Discussion and concluding remarks
Our analysis shows that stealth democracy attitudes foster the support for new and challenger parties, particularly when they are moderate and they defend reforms on the democratic decision-making processes characterized by low-intensity citizen participation. In the Spanish context this is the case for the new right-to-the-center party,
Ciudadanos. On the contrary, stealth attitudes decrease the support for new and challenger parties that enhance citizens' involvement in the democratic decision-making process, like Podemos.
The analysis developed in this article, although novel, would not be complete without echoing the methodological discussion of the limits of the stealth democracy index. The index has shown its usefulness for comparative analyses, but it has also been subject to criticism. Webb (2013: 754) argues that the index fails to capture one of the critical 16 Regression analyses show low values for McFadden's pseudo R-square, which means that the model with predictors is a much better fit than the one without them. Although to seek a comprehensive model of voting is not the aim of our study, we are still aware that results might be affected by an omitted variable bias.
dimensions of stealth democracy, namely people's attitude toward conflict or dispute, which is intrinsic to the political debate. Neblo et al. (2010: 577-8) suggest that people expressing stealth democracy beliefs may have conditional attitudes towards the content of the items, which could lead to different interpretations of the index. Font et al. (2012: 27) disagree with the aggregation of what they consider conceptually unrelated aspects of citizens' preferences. Additionally, in the same line, Font et al. (2015: 163) demonstrate that business-based governance does not perfectly match the other expert-based items.
As in other studies, the index built with our survey data is not exempt from potential weaknesses. In fact, the aggregation of the four items of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's stealth democracy index in our survey produces a low reliability Cronbach's alpha score (0.36), although it improves upon the one obtained in a previous analysis of the Spanish case 17 . Therefore, without detracting from the theoretical content of the stealth democracy concept, we believe that due to the weakness of the measurement tool, studies using this index should also complement the analyses with further exploration of the separate effects of its four components. In doing so, we may derive a nuanced image of the relationship between stealth democracy and party choice.
Results of this exploration are shown in Table 3 . They reveal a more complex picture than the one obtained using the compound index. Two of the index's items, namely the support for the claims that 'Politicians should stop talking' and 'Compromise is selling out one's principles', do not have any effect on voting intentions 18 .
( Table 3 about 
